Features of gait are determined at multiple levels, from the selection of the gait itself (e.g. walk or run) through the specific parameters utilized (stride length, frequency, etc.) to the pattern of muscular excitation. The ultimate choices are neurally determined, but what is involved with that decision process? Human locomotion appears stereotyped not so much because the pattern is predetermined, but because these movement patterns are good solutions for providing movement utilizing the machinery available to the individual (the legs and (...) their requisite components). Under different circumstances the appropriate solution may differ broadly (different gait) or subtly (different parameters). Interpretation of the neural decision making process would benefit from understanding the influences that determine the selection of the appropriate solution in any set of circumstances, including that of normal conditions. In this review we survey an array of studies that point to energetic cost as a key input to the gait coordination system, and not just an outcome of the gait pattern implemented. We then use that information to rigorously define the construct proposed by Sparrow and Newell (1998) where the effects of environment, organism and task act as constraints determining the solution set available, and the coordination pattern is then implemented under a pressure for energetic economy. Environment is defined in terms of affordances based on the ecological psychology definition of the concept and organism is defined as classic morphology and physiology based capabilities. We rely on a novel conceptualization of task that recognizes that the task goal needs to be separated from the mechanisms that achieve the goal if the motivation behind the selection of the mechanism strategy is to be exposed and understood. This reformulation of the Sparrow and Newell construct is then linked to the proposed pressure for economy by considering it as an optimization problem, where the most readily selected gait strategy will be that which achieves the task goal at (or near) the energetic minimum. (shrink)

This volume brings together academics from a variety of disciplines to discuss Collingwood's contributions to philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of history, political philosophy and archaeological theory. It begins with a general survey of his contribution to history, politics and philosophy.

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

Collingwood's review of F.J. Teggart's Theory of History is predominantly critical. Teggart gets short shrift for over-voluminous extensive quoting at the expense of developing his major theses, his methodological confusion and his inadequate metaphysics -- the conceptions of 'event' and 'process' he relies on being the chief culprits.

_ Source: _Page Count 24 The project of this paper is a reconstruction of the philosophy of Giambattista Vico via its confrontation with that of R. G. Collingwood. The aims are twofold: the first part seeks to rescue Vico’s peculiar form of what I call philosophical ‘materiality’ from the later idealist universal histories that would subsume him, while the second explores Vico’s idea of divine providence, particularly his differentiation between it and fate. Materiality and divine providence are importantly linked. (...) I argue that any ‘return’ to Vico and his interest in a philosophically charged reception history, represents a rejection of the Cartesian grounding of modern philosophy, in the name of another potentiality for philosophical reflection that is grounded in the notion of materiality and divine providence. Although unambiguously influenced by Hegelian and in particular Crocean idealism, the fundamental hopes of Collingwood’s philosophy – namely the staving off of modernity’s regression into barbarism – resonates with this Vichean potentiality. (shrink)

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

The question, R. M. Hare concedes, “has assumed great importance in the thought of some philosophers, for example Cook Wilson and Collingwood.” A concession, because after a couple of sentences Hare concludes: “we need say no more about questions.” The implication is that in contrast with his two Oxford predecessors the topic has little importance in his philosophy. This isn’t quite so, it will be seen. But it is in line with a tendency among philosophers to relegate the topic, (...) often quite literally, to a footnote. They would be wiser to take questions more seriously; not least because any theory of meaning which connects meaning in some way to the concept of truth—as most do—has to explain how interrogative sentences, which cannot sensibly be said to express what is true or false, can yet have a meaning. Questions also present a challenge to the easy assumption that all thought is either true or false. Even to think of something, it can be argued, is to think that certain descriptions are true of it: to think of a cat is to think of something as having four legs, fur, and so forth. Collingwood’s way of meeting the challenge isn’t immediately apparent. In An Autobiography he does seem to reject the assumption. (shrink)

Metaphysics, for Collingwood, is an historical science. Accordingly, nature and the science of nature did not occupy a prominent position within his general scheme. To appreciate this fact and to consider how this deficiency might be overcome requires that we first attend to the disconnected nature of the doctrines that loosely comprise that scheme. More specifically, we must examine the problematical relationship between Collingwood’s familiar theory of presuppositions and his less frequently discussed doctrine of the scale of forms (...) presented in An Essay on Philosophical Method. This latter task will serve as a focus both for an analysis of the general difficulties that beset Collingwood’s particular formulation of a dialectical method, as well as for an exploration of a possible resolution of these difficulties —a resolution along lines which, admittedly, Collingwood himself did not explicitly follow. A few general comments on the tension between dialectical and idealist elements in his metaphysics will conclude the discussion. (shrink)

This book argues that Collingwood developed a complete political philosophy of civilization. It also demonstrates that his philosophical work comprises a unity in which there is no fundamental discontinuity between his earlier and later writings.

_ Source: _Page Count 25 Every political philosopher has a philosophy of political history, if sometimes not a very good one. Oakeshott and Collingwood are two twentieth century political philosophers who were particularly concerned with the significance of history for political philosophy; and who both, in the 1940s, sketched what I call philosophies of political history: that is, systematic schemes which could make sense of the entire history of political philosophy. In this article I observe that Oakeshott depended for (...) the political threefold sketched in his Introduction to Hobbes’s _Leviathan_ on a threefold Collingwood had developed in relation to science in _The Idea of Nature_. This is, I think, a novel observation. I contrast this political threefold with Collingwood’s own political threefold in _The New Leviathan_. I then consider the neglect of these schemes, along with the rare attempts to defend such philosophies of history in the writings of Greenleaf and Boucher. My own claim is that these philosophies of political history are exemplary: and that the threefold is, for obvious Hegelian reasons, a still useful form for this sort of reflection. Political philosophy is likely to improve the more it takes the philosophy of political history seriously. (shrink)

R G Collingwood is an important twentieth century historian, archaeologist and philosopher whose works are the subject of continued interest, analysis and study. There is an unquestionable need to support this research activity with the provision of a reference guide which is fully up-to-date, informed and authoritative. The Companion will therefore list all primary and secondary material relevant to the study of Collingwood in all his fields of expertise - historical theory, philosophy and archaeology. It will also provide (...) a guide to archive material relevant to his life, together with sources and locations. The resulting volume will provide an essential companion to the understanding of the life and thought of R G Collingwood. (shrink)

Connelly discusses the development of Collingwood’s conception of philosophical methodology and how his early reflections on the role and character of philosophical analysis gradually gave rise to his mature metaphilosophical views. He shows that concerns with second-order questions concerning the nature of philosophy were present from the very beginning and that Collingwood’s later metaphilosophical view gradually evolve from, rather than break away with, his earlier metaphilosophical reflections. The chapter provides a much-needed guide to understanding how Collingwood developed (...) his mature metaphilosophical views concerning the nature of philosophy through his engagement with Oxford realism and logical positivism. (shrink)

In so far as Collingwood is branded an ‘idealist’, the corresponding assumption is that he subscribed to the broad themes associated with the ‘English idealists or Hegelians’; in so far as he is thought to have broken free from their pernicious influence he is regarded as a proto-Kuhn or Wittgenstein who saw the error of his early ways. This paper suggests that neither picture is fully accurate, and that while the figure of F.H. Bradley perhaps played a more significant (...) part in Collingwood’s philosophical development than is often recognised, his role was that of a spur or challenge to his thinking. Coming to terms with Bradley was a struggle throughout his philosophical career. I suggest that Collingwood took from Bradley the dual problematic of the method appropriate to philosophical thought and the tangled question of the nature of metaphysics. These were both problems which he wrestled with throughout his life, and Bradley’s work can be seen as setting the agenda for his thought on these matters. (shrink)

This chapter considers and evaluates the philosophical relationship between Alexander and R.G. Collingwood, focusing particularly on metaphysics and the philosophy of history. Their relationship was founded not on their agreement but to a considerable extent on their differences and their willingness to offer and accept critical commentary on each other’s writings. Following the publication of his An Essay on Philosophical Method in 1933, Collingwood sought to develop his own positive metaphysical system, which consists of a developmental and historical (...) view of reality. It is argued that Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity played a central part in Collingwood’s construction of his system, supplemented by the work of Whitehead and other process and emergence philosophers. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCollingwood's The New Leviathan is a difficult text. It comprises philosophy, political theory, political opinion and history in what is sometimes an uneasy amalgam. Despite its being the culmination of thirty years of work in ethics and political theory, the final text was clearly affected by the adverse circumstances under which it was written, these largely being Collingwood's illness which increasingly affected his ability to work as the writing of The New Leviathan progressed. This paper seeks to disentangle the (...) composition of the book thereby shedding light on its distinctive character as the last substantial piece of philosophical work published in Collingwood's lifetime. (shrink)

The J. A. Smith collection at Magdalen College, Oxford, contains an unsigned carbon copy, dated 1914, titled "The Theory of History." The manuscript, if Collingwood's, is his earliest essay on the philosophy of history. That "The Theory of History" may be Collingwood's is established by considerations of chronology, geography, and the appearance of certain intellectual interests mirrored in his other writing of the period 1913 to 1920. Present in the manuscript also are: the principles of the ideality of (...) history, or the unity of past and present in the historian's thought; the principle that historical knowledge presupposes judgment, and therefore, like knowledge generally, changes both knower and known; the conviction that the past is necessarily contemporary; the dialectic between judgment and evidence which is somehow not purely subjective but yields genuine knowledge, and the analogous rejection of the positivistic notions that history is unknowable; and the interest in and identification or near identification of philosophy and history. All these are seminal to everything Collingwood would write on history from 1913 to 1940. (shrink)

This article asks to what extent R.G. Collingwood's 'logic of question and answer' is compatible with the central tenets of Giovanni Gentile's 'actualism'. It is argued that, interpreted as an actualist device, Collingwood's 'logic' offers useful insights into the mechanisms underlying Gentile's theory. Both must confront what I call the 'Actualist Dilemma,' which holds that if there is no reality independent of actual thinking, truth becomes entirely relative to whatever beliefs a thinker happens to have, including those regarding (...) the structures and conditions by which truth is determined. Understood as attempts to address the basic problem of the relation between truth and inquiry, these theories are more alike than they first appear. For both, the foundation of truth is an interpersonal standard regarded from the subjective standpoint of actual thinking. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy, neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers, especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and because he (...) mounted a critique of analytical philosophy in the years of its emergence. (shrink)

This article is a commentary on R.G. Collingwood,d “The So-Called Idea of Causation” invited by the International Journal of Epidemiology. It discusses the relevance of Collingwood's ideas for current conceptions of causation, both in epidemiology and elsewhere. The connection between interventionist treatments of causation and the use of instrumental variables and "Mendelian randomization" is also noted.

This dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by considering artworks which exemplify it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more broadly the role of (...) utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances' meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced. Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and briefly argues that it is very valuable. (shrink)

R. G. Collingwood’s 'The Principles of Art' argues that art is the expression of emotion. This dissertation offers a new interpretation of that philosophy, and argues that this interpretation is both hermeneutically and philosophically plausible. The offered interpretation differs from the received interpretation most significantly in treating the concept of ‘art’ as primarily scalarly rather than binarily realisable (this is introduced in ch. 1), and in understanding Collingwood’s use of the term ‘emotion’ more broadly (introduced in ch. 2). (...) -/- After the exposition of ch. 1, the remainder of that chapter and the subsequent three chapters are each centred around one sort of objection. In ch. 1, I consider the objection that Collingwood’s scalar understanding of ‘art’ is deviant and unhelpful. I respond by first observing that the understanding is not deviant, and second that it is more philosophically and artistically illuminating. In ch. 2, I consider the objection that Collingwood’s understanding of ‘emotion’ is so narrow that it fails to do justice to the fact that art can be philosophically potent. I respond that his understanding of ‘emotion’ is broad enough that this objection fails. In ch. 3, I consider the objection that Collingwood has no theoretical room for the prima facie plausible thought that some emotions are not worth expressing in art. In response, I reinterpret the points that appear to support this contention in a way that makes them both more plausible and more Collingwoodian. Finally, in ch. 4, I consider the objection that Collingwood does not have the theoretical room to do justice to the value of the delight we take in art. I respond by arguing that although he does not have this room to say that this delight is itself an artistic value, it does yet have an important place in his philosophy. (shrink)

Siegfried Kracauer's reading of the work of R.G. Collingwood illuminates the crisis point in the relation between philosophy, history and how the present is thought. In this paper I argue that Kracauer's dismissal of Collingwood illuminates a misunderstanding of the latter's philosophical project, and takes no account of a certain affinity between the two thinkers. Collingwood not only shared Kracauer's view that a philosophically oriented historical investigation of the past might offer some hope for the present, but (...) also had a fuller grasp of the philosophical implications of the ambivalent relation between historical time and the present than Kracauer gave him credit for. (shrink)

Through a consideration of the views of R.G. Collingwood on historical knowledge and conceptual change, this paper addresses organisational issues such as history, culture and memory. It then subjects the idea of ‘learning histories’ to critical scrutiny. It concludes that, because of their potential to become framing mental models, they may be in danger of failing to achieve the purposes for which they are used.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of part of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, in particular that dealing with the relationship between art, craft and magic, in relation to the corruption of consciousness, and to consider some of the implications for the aesthetic evaluation of ‘works of art’ produced as moral or political propaganda. I shall try to do this by drawing on the work of Matthew Kieran in relation to art and morality. I will (...) not so much analyse or criticise Collingwood’s conception of the corruption of consciousness as presuppose it as the conception which makes sense of Collingwood’s understanding of the relation between art and morality. (shrink)

Recent reports of the discovery of a “God module” in the human brain derive from the fact that epileptic seizures in the left temporal lobe are associated with ecstatic feelings sometimes described as an experience of the presence of God. The brain area involved has been described as either (a) the seat of an innate human faculty for experiencing the divine or (b) the seat of religious delusions.In fact, religious experience is extremely various and involves many parts of the brain, (...) including some that are prehuman in their evolutionary history and some that are characteristically human. In the continuing integration of such experiences, spiritual formation takes place. Thus the entire human brain might be described as a “God module.”Such a process is only possible because of the brain's complexity. The human brain is the most complex entity for its size that we know of. As used here, complexity is a specialized term denoting the presence of a web of interlinked and significant connections—the more intricate the web, the more complex the entity. Complex systems develop only in a milieu that provides both lawfulness and freedom, and they tend to be self‐organizing, becoming more complex and more effective as a result of both inward and outward experience. The evidence suggests that both personal growth and spiritual growth are processes of complexification of character, and of the brain itself. This thesis is tested in light of the work of William James and James W. Fowler. (shrink)

R.G.Collingwood's Autobiography is the next of Collingwood's books to be revised for a new edition by Oxford University Press.It will include new manuscript material, include his Log of a Journey to the East Indies In addition there will be a number of scholarly essays relating Collingwood's ideas to his life and broader concerns.It is opportune to make available in English two introductions to the German and Romanian editions of An Autobiography.

In mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, the relation between cognition and community has been defined primarily in terms of the generalization of the mathematical function, especially as a model for the nature of rules, which thus come to be under-stood as algorithms. This leads to the elimination of both the reflexive, synthesizing subject, and the intrinsic communal-historical nature of argumentation and belief-formation. Against this approach, I follow R.G. Collingwood’s hitherto unrecognized strategy in his Essay on Metaphysics and argue that the relation (...) of cognition and community is better understood by way of the ancient and forgotten model of creedal rules of faith or trust. These will be shown to have the logical form of first person performative rules of faith or trust that generate third person declaratives or proposi-tions, and so constitute the possibility conditions for an argumentational logic of question and answer. They restore the synthetic subject, for they are not algorithms but reflexive and interpretive formulae; they are communally constituted and so historically saturated; and they reinstate an ontological theory of truth as disclosure, with coherence and comprehensiveness as its criteria. In these respects, as Collingwood saw, the creedal model provides a fresh interpretation of the historicality of argumentation and redefines the relation of cognition and community in terms of the interdependence of faith and reason. (shrink)

There are strong grounds for believing that Collingwood cannot have been the author of "The Theory of History." First, the "Theory of History" is a typescript, and while Smith had papers typed up from time to time, Collingwood generally did not. Second, Collingwood, who kept good records, did not refer to "The Theory of History" either in his Autobiography or in his detailed "List of Work Done." Third, Collingwood always held the firm belief that good philosophy (...) could only arise out of a reflection upon the philosopher's own personal experience, yet the work, written in 1914 when Collingwood was busy working on archaeological excavations at Ambleside, contains no archaeological references. Fourth, the philosophical content of "The Theory of History" is anachronistic for the young Collingwood writing in 1914, for at that time he had no marked interest in the philosophy of history. Fifth, the semi-colon, used quite frequently by Collingwood and indicating a genuine stylistic characteristic, is used at a much less frequent rate by the author of the "The Theory of History.". (shrink)

What is it to be clear? And will that question have the same answer in science, poetry, and philosophy? This paper offers a taxonomy of clarity, before focusing on two notions that are pertinent to the notions of clarity in science, poetry, and, in particular, philosophy. It argues that “scientific clarity,” which is marked by its reliance on technical terms, is, though often appropriate, not the only way in which something can be clear. In particular, poetry entirely eschews technical terms—but (...) can nonetheless be crystal clear. Poetry achieves this clarity by sensitivity to the richness of language: rhythm, ambiguity, and so on. The paper argues that some philosophy uses language in this same way to achieve its philosophical ends. Accordingly, we should allow that this is a legitimate philosophical method and should not judge the clarity of such philosophy by the standards of scientific clarity. (shrink)

Had I not read that book in the months leading up to my university finals I might never have gained that real enthusiasm and excitement for ideas which has possessed me ever since. Before that time I played with the academic world in a desultory fashion, moving the thoughts, thinkers and theories in front of me as though they were merely so many counters. After I read Collingwood everything changed, and I believe the same can be true for any (...) of its readers. (shrink)

Bradley's rich and complex version of Absolute Idealism plays a key role not only in Idealist philosophy, politics, and ethics, but also in the development of modern logic, analytical philosophy, and pragmatism, as well as in the thinking of such figures as R. G. Collingwood and A. N. Whitehead. Topics covered include: the history of Idealism in the twentieth century; Bradley's relation to figures such as Bernard Bosanquet, C. A. Campbell, Brand Blanshard, John Watson, John Dewey, and others; Bradley's (...) influence on twentieth-century empiricism, modern logic, and analytical philosophy; and his significance for contemporary debates in epistemology and ethics. (shrink)

This essay examines the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences and Christian theology in order to complement the epistemic claims from both disciplines. These foundations include Robin Collingwood's notion of presuppositions and Ernan McMullin's epistemic and non-epistemic values. Specifically, the essay investigates the presuppositions and values of science and theology used for guiding and constraining the formation and evaluation of scientific theories and theological doctrines. Practitioners in both disciplines need to keep these presuppositions and values in mind when complementing (...) epistemic claims to form a comprehensive world picture. Complementing scientific and theological claims requires wisdom and restraint in analyzing the presuppositions and values that make such claims possible. For, theology without the input of science, and science without the input of theology, may lead to an impoverished world picture. (shrink)